

Seeds of SEED: H-CRAM: In-memory Homomorphic Search Accelerator using Spintronic Computational RAM

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University of Minnesota

This work was supported in part by NSF grant no. SPX-1725420.



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- **H-CRAM: SCAM in CRAM to accelerate homomorphic search**

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SCAM Fundamentals

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
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CRAM Basics


2Transistor-1Magnet CRAM cells

- Logic Line (LL)
- Even/Odd Select Lines (E/OSL)
- Wordline Read/Write (WLR/W)




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


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
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
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
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
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 - **Practically universal NAND gate!**


H-CRAM: SCAM in CRAM

- RCA: $O(n)$, CLA and others: $O(n \log n)$ ($O(\log n)$ depth)
- CLA adder based SCAM logic flow




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
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- Mapped to **Processing** and **Control** arrays
- De Bruijn graph topology for inter-array connectivity




Results





H-CRAM CLA is **2× faster** vs. HEGA, **~EDP** vs. 2T+1 FeFET

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H-CRAM scales efficiently with word size!

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 - Multi-grain parallelism
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- Future work: general purpose homomorphic computing
 - How to extend H-CRAM to more complex homomorphic computation without bootstrapping?

Thank you!
Questions?